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ABSTRACT: Spectrum shortage is a major problem in wireless communications. 
Existing research on attacks and security issues in CR networks focus on individual 
network layers. In this thesis, we identify a cross-layer attack, called the Stasis Trap 
attack. This attack is launched from the MAC layer as the point of attack but the final 
target goal is to degrade TCP layer end to end throughput of flows by exploiting the TCP 
congestion control mechanism in cognitive radio. The chances of the attacker being 
detected are low owing to the fact that the target layer is different from the layer where 
the attack is launched.  
An adversary launches an attack on the MAC layer causing large variations in Round 
Trip Time (RTT) resulting in a large drop in throughput of TCP flows (drop of around 
40% from our simulation results) but has little effect on the MAC-layer throughput and 
hence is very difficult to detect.  
A defense for this Stasis Trap attack is proposed using a deterministic key pre-
distribution algorithm where the keys are pre-distributed to nodes and If any two nodes 
want to communicate with each other, they either search for a common key and a 
common channel between them or look for intermediate nodes which have the same in 
common and communicate through them. Simulation results show that the throughput 
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1.1 Overview of Cognitive Radio Networks 
Cognitive Radio (CR) Networks aim to make good use of vacant spectrum.  This 
technology allows the coexistence and sharing of licensed spectrum resources between 
two types of users, licensed (Primary Users or PU) and unlicensed (Secondary Users or 
SU). This helps to solve the problem of spectrum sharing by allowing SUs to use primary 
systems without interference. CR nodes can sense their environment and spectrum, 
`analyze the discovered information, and adjust to the sensed environment.  
Cognitive Radio techniques provide the capability to use or share the spectrum in an 
opportunistic manner [3]. CR: 
➢ Enables the users to determine which portions of the spectrum are available and 
detect the presence of Primary Users (Spectrum Sensing). 
➢ Selects the best available channel (Spectrum Management). 
➢ Coordinates access to this channel with other users (Spectrum Sharing). 
➢ Vacates the channel when a licensed user is detected (Spectrum Mobility). 
IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol’s Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) is effective in 












case in a hostile environment as, DCF is vulnerable to attacks. This results in exploiting 
the contention coordination mechanism against the MAC protocol which can range from 
selfish exploitation to malicious network disruptions [8].  
In Cognitive Radio, we need to firstly identify (i) requirements of protocols for the 
transport layer of Cognitive Radio networks. (ii) propose a generic architecture for 
implementing the protocols. (iii) design, implement and evaluate the best-effort transport 
protocols [2]. The protocols proposed can use information from all layers and estimate 
parameters to provide efficient services to the applications. 
The launch of multiple-layer attacks where there may be some coordination of attack 
activities between different layers is more pronounced in CR technology [6]. Attackers 
have the capability to launch attacks in multiple layers simultaneously. In this paper, we 
show how attackers can significantly reduce throughput whilst being undetected. Here we 
choose Stasis Strap attack (cross layer attack) where the target layer is different from the 
point of attack, thus making the attack stealthy. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In this paper, we identify a cross-layer attack called “Stasis Trap” attack that can be 
launched in CR networks. In this attack, the adversary uses the MAC layer as point of 
attack and ultimately aims to degrade TCP layer throughput of flows within its 












is gathered, using distributed spectrum sensing. The information collected is used by the 
dynamic spectrum allocation mechanism. MAC protocols use the common control 
channel which plays an important role in enabling the nodes to exchange local 
information. There is a channel contention problem, where Distributed Coordination 
Function adopts a back-off mechanism, by manipulating the back-off value by using a 
small contention window [4]. The adversaries transmit data for a certain amount of time 
to cause delays in the TCP flows that are traversing through neighboring nodes, and then 
stop the transmission. This process of preempting the channel is repeated after a certain 
time duration. 
Though the transport protocols are planned to provide reliable end-to-end transport 
service, due to the periodic blocking of the channel due to the stasis trap attack, there are 
periodic delay spikes in the TCP flow. This would result in Retransmission Timeout 
(RTO). Due to this the, the congestion control mechanism reduces the congestion 
window size to one and the outstanding packets are re-sent. 
1.3 Research Objective 
Though a considerable amount of research has been done on the susceptibilities of the CR 
network layers, very little investigation regarding cross-layer attacks has been done. 
These attacks are difficult to detect mainly because of the way they attack the network. 












functioning of another layer (target layer). They are difficult to detect because the attack 
and target points belong to different layers. 
Our goal is to design a cross-layer attack called ‘Stasis Trap’ in Cognitive Radio 
Networks where the point of attack is at the MAC layer and aims to degrade TCP layer 
(target layer) throughput by exploiting TCP’s congestion control mechanism. We design 
a defense for this attack by using a novel key pre distribution scheme which uses the 
Chinese remainder theorem for generating keys [11]. 
1.4 Organization of Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis document is organized as follows. In Section II we briefly 
review the Related Work of MACs DCF and Transport Layer Protocol with its rules. In 
Section III we go through the Stasis Trap attack in CR network and in Section IV we 














                CHAPTER II 
 
 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
The following sections give an overview of Cognitive Radio networks and explain its 
functionalities in the MAC layer and Transport layer. We focus on the attacks at these 
layers. Next we look at the Chinese remainder theorem and routing schema in CR which 
we used for defense against this attack. 
2.1 Cognitive Radio Networks 
Cognitive Radios are expected to mitigate the spectrum scarcity problem through 
intelligent use of the fallow spectrum bands. However, as CRNs are wireless in nature, 
they face common security threats found in traditional wireless networks. Current 
literature on CRNs describes several approaches for spectrum sensing, spectrum 
management and spectrum mobility which may face new security threats and challenges. 
CR has two main characteristics [3] 
➢ Cognitive capability: makes the devices capable of sensing their environment and 
choosing the best available transmission mode in the free spectrum bands. This 
becomes feasible through the spectrum management process where several physical 
layer parameters are estimated. 
➢ Reconfigurability:  this enables a CR to change several of its parameters and adapt to 












the CR should vacate the band. 
Since most of the spectrum is already assigned, the most important challenge is to share 
the licensed spectrum without interfering with the transmission of other licensed users. 
The temporarily unused spectrum is referred as ‘spectrum hole or whitespace’ which is 
used by the unlicensed users (Secondary users).  
Cognitive Radio Architecture 
The CRN architecture is classified into two groups, the primary network and xG network 














Figure 1: Cognitive Network Architecture [3] 
Primary network: An existing network is referred as the primary network, which has 
exclusive right to a spectrum band.  
➢ Primary User or PU (Licensed user) has a license to operate in a designated 
spectrum band. This access can only be controlled by the primary base-station. 
➢ Primary Base-station: It is a fixed infrastructure network component which has a 
spectrum license. The primary base station does not have any cognitive capability for 













Cognitive Network: Cognitive Networks do not have license to operate in the desired 
band and hence, they use the different Cognitive Radio techniques which provide the 
capability to use or share the spectrum in an opportunistic manner. 
➢ Cognitive (xG) user (Secondary User): This user has no spectrum license. Hence, it 
requires additional functionalities to share the licensed spectrum band. 
➢ Cognitive (xG) base-station: The Cognitive users connect to a Cognitive base-
station which provides a single-hop connection to them without spectrum access 
license. A cognitive user can accesses other networks, through this connection. 
➢ Spectrum broker: The spectrum broker is a central network entity that plays a role 
in sharing the spectrum resources among different cognitive networks. The broker is 
connected to each network and can serve as a spectrum information manager to 
enable coexistence of multiple cognitive networks. 
Cognitive users can communicate with each other in a multi hop manner or access the 
base station.  
Cognitive (xG) network access: Cognitive users can access their own base-station both 
on licensed and unlicensed spectrum bands. 
Cognitive (xG) ad hoc access: Cognitive users can communicate with other cognitive 
users through ad hoc connection on both the bands.  












through the licensed band. 
2.2 Distributed Channel Negotiation in MAC layer 
In CR networks channel negotiation is carried in a distributed manner, between sender 
and receiver. During channel negotiation, MAC frames are used as: Free Channel List 
(FCL), SELection (SEL), and REServation (RES) [4].  
 
Figure 2: Distributed Channel negotiation process [4] 
Initially, the sender identifies fallow spectrum bands and allots them into logical 
channels, to obtain FCL and sends it to the receiver after a back-off time. After receiving 
the FCL, the receiver identifies available channels common to both sides and chooses one 
data channel by indicating SEL frame and the sender notifies its neighbors of the channel 
selection with a RES frame. When the sender transmits FCL frame, the Neighbor 1 
refrains from transmitting, by maintaining a network allocation vector (NAV) specified in 












In order to avoid RTS collision, the node that is to transmit the data needs to delay the 
transmission for a back-off period. The back-off value is selected arbitrarily from the 
range [0, CW] (where CW – contention window size). . A node transmits RTS frame to 
reserve a channel when the back-off value is reduced to zero. If an adversary uses a small 
CW value, it can preempt the channel and prevent others from accessing it. 
2.3 Conventional Detection Technique 
To detect such misbehaviors, a sequential analysis is performed whilst observing the 
back-off value to detect these types of attacks. The nodes that are within the transmission 
range can measure the back-off value.  
A Sender with data to transmit has to defer transmission for a back-off period to avoid an 
RTS collision. The back-off value is chosen from the range [0, CW] where CW is the 
contention window size. When the back-off timer is decremented to zero, then the sender 
can send frames to reserve the channel. If the attacker uses a small CW value, it can 















        Figure 3: Qualified Observers [1] 
In the above figure 3, node A is an attacker. Node A transmits data to node R. In this 
scenario, node R and O can calculate the back-off time value by computing the time 
interval between the ACK transmitted from R. The term qualified observers is used to 
describe the nodes that are located within the transmission range of both MAC sender and 
receiver, which are qualified to calculate the back-off times used by the sender. We 
specify R and O as qualified observers. 
However, the adversary could escape from detection by changing its transmission 
destination. In the above situation node A transmits to R for some time and periodically 
changes its direction to node B before the qualified observers spot the intruder. Using this 
technique, the attacker can thwart detection of sequential tests performed by neighboring 
nodes. 
2.4 Transport Layer Protocol 













Figure 4: Network Layout in CR Networks [2] 
The above layout of the TCP network is used for simulation purposes. The router 
represents a gateway. The connection between router and destination is wired or wireless. 
The link between source and router will be changed based on the whether the primary 
user is present or not. The CR-link alternates between spectrum sensing and transmission 
modes. This shows periodic abrupt increase or decrease of RTT (round trip time) [2]. 
When CR-link changes to spectrum sensing mode, no packets are received by the source.  
After the completion of spectrum sensing the source node receives several 
acknowledgments which were waiting in network and thus the RTT is then calculated. 
This is the reason there is an abrupt increase in RTT. 
If the spectrum sensing duration combined with the currently observed RTT is greater 
than RTO (Retransmission Time Out) timer value, then RTO timer expires while the CR 
node is in the spectrum sensing state. Timeouts, closing the congestion window are 
reduced to half of the previous size and the TCP gets into slow-start state.  
The cognitive Transport layer is shown in the below diagram and its interfaces with the 













              Figure 5: Transport Layer Interface for Cognitive Networks [2] 
The cognitive functionality in the transport layer is divided into two modules; the 
Knowledge module (KM) which is for storing information or knowledge about the 
application’s need and the status of local and global networks; the Cognitive module 
(CM) is for algorithms and heuristics for gathering knowledge and to control signals with 
the KM [2]. 
Decision Making Rules of the transport layer protocol in CR networks are [2]: 
➢ R1: If estimate of cwnd (congestion window) is known, then 
i. Set cwnd to the estimated cwnd and 
ii. Enter into the congestion-avoidance state 
➢ R2: If rtt[i] > rtt[i – 1] + 0.9 × ssd, Then the packet is delayed because of spectrum 













➢ R3: If packet delayed because of spectrum sensing, and then they do not update rtt or 
srtt 
➢ R4: If RTO timer expires while sensing spectrum then reset RTO timer and take no 
further action (RTO – Retransmission Timeout). 
➢ R5: If BWC decreases then set cwnd to match BWC. (BWC – Available bandwidth) 
➢ R6: If BWC increases and EBWI ≥ BWC then set cwnd to match BWC. (EBWI – 
Estimated Bandwidth) 
➢ R7: If BWC increases and EBWI < BWC then 
i. Set cwnd to match EBWI AND 
ii. Enter slow-start state 
 
2.5 Individual Layer attacks in Cognitive Radio Network 
Based on the layer, attacks have been classified into Physical, Link, Network and 
Transport. Ad Hoc attacks can target Cognitive Radio (CR) networks which are also 
considered to be Ad Hoc networks [7]. 
Physical Layer Attacks 
Primary User Emulation (PUE): According to the CR model, a Secondary user (SU) is 
allowed to use a specific band as long as it is not occupied by any Primary User (PU). 
When it detects the presence of a PU, it switches channels immediately to an alternative 












that are used to share the spectrum fairly. 
However, a malicious secondary user may emulate a primary user to obtain the resources 
of the channel so that it does not have to share the same band with the other secondary 
user. This is called a PUE attack [7]. 
Objective Function Attack:  Cognitive Radio has the ability to sense the external 
environment, learn from the history and make intelligent decisions to adjust its 
transmission parameters. The ‘Cognitive Engine’ is used to find the radio parameters 
appropriate to the current environment. 
An attacker can launch this attack by manipulating the parameters (transmission rate) to 
make the results biased to his interest [7]. 
Jamming: An attacker (Jammer) may send continuous packets of data making a 
legitimate user to never sense a channel as idle or may force them to receive junk 
packets. The most dangerous attack would be to jam the dedicated channel that is used 
for spectrum sensing information between CRs [7]. 
Link Layer Attacks 
Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification: In this type of attack, an attacker sends false local 
spectrum sensing results to its neighbors, causing the receiver to make a wrong spectrum-












Control Channel Saturation DOS Attack: In multi-hop CRN, CRs communicate with 
each other after performing a channel negotiation process in a distributed manner. During 
this phase, MAC control frames are exchanged to reserve the channel. An attacker can 
utilize this feature to decrease the network performance by forging the MAC control 
frames for the purpose of saturating the control channel [7]. 
Selfish Channel Negotiation: In multi-hop CRN, a CR host can refuse to forward any 
data for other hosts. This will allow it conserve its energy and increase its own 
throughput [7]. 
Network Layer Attacks 
Sinkhole Attack: An attacker advertises itself as the best route to a specific destination, 
luring neighboring nodes to use it to forward their packets [7]. 
HELLO Flood Attack: An attacker sends a broadcast message to all the nodes in a 
network with enough power to convince them that it is their neighbor. However, their 
packets will be lost and if anode discovers the attack it will be left with no neighbors to 
forward its packets because all of them would be using the same route [7]. 
 Cross Layer Attacks in Cognitive Radio Networks 
Lion Attack: This attack is considered as a cross-layer attack where the point of attack is 












the Transport layer. This attack will force CRN to perform frequency handoffs, thus 
degrading TCP performance [7]. 
Attack A1: Attackers can reduce channel utilization by [6] 
➢ Making honest secondary users wrongly believe the existence of a primary user 
when it is absent through PUE attack or Reporting False Sensing Data Attack 
(RFSD) in Physical Layer. 
➢ Reducing the probability of honest secondary users utilizing the channel in MAC 
layer, through common control channel DoS attack, Small back-off window 
attack (SBW). 
These attacks have an “OR” Relationship, one attack can achieve the goal of reducing the 
channel utilization. 
Attack A2: When CR node is near to the PU while it is transmitting, they cause 
interference to the primary user [6]. 
➢ CR nodes fail to detect the existence of the primary user, which can be done 
through RFSD (Reporting False Sensing Data) attack. 
➢ They have to transmit data and this can be achieved through routing protocols in 
the network layer. 













Distortion of Spectrum Availability 
CR MAC protocols rely on cooperative sensing mechanisms to determine the set of free 
channels. A malicious CR can report false sensing observations to distort the spectrum 
availability. A single false report can prevent access to idle channels [7] [9]. 
Spectrum distortion can be easily achieved in spectrum information sharing techniques 
that utilize the spectrum using busy tones. These tones are unauthenticated and they can 
be transmitted by any CR without reflecting the true channel state.  
 
Figure 6: Alternating phases in Cognitive Radio MAC [5] 
In the above diagram, there are four CRs A-D and three channels f1-f3. During spectrum 












information sharing phase, CRs transmit a busy tone to indicate that f2 is occupied. This 
is the Alternating control and data phases for a CR- MAC [5]. 
During the control phase, CR sense for the idle channels and share their sensing 
observations by transmitting busy tones on dedicated time slots. Cognitive Radios 
negotiate the spectrum allocation for the upcoming data phase. During the Data phase, 
CRs switch to the negotiated channels. To avoid interference In-band sensing is 
performed with Primary users. A  PU may appear at any channel during the data phase, 
thereby incorporating a periodic quiet period (QP) during which CRs perform in-band 
sensing. If a PU is detected, CRs abandon the current channel by switching to a back-up 
one.  
For example, a malicious Cognitive Radio D could transmit a busy tone on every slot 
during the spectrum information sharing phase, thus indicating that channels f1-f3 are 
occupied by Primary Users. CRs A, B and C will differ from communicating in the 
upcoming data phase. 
2.6 Chinese Remainder Theorem: 
We proposed a defense to the Stasis Trap attack based on key pre-distribution using the 
Chinese Remainder theorem (CRT) [11]. Here, we are using CRT for generating keys. 
We chose CRT for key generation because this scheme is suitable to achieve a goal 












The Chinese remainder theorem is a result about congruence in number theory. Its basic 
form will determine a number ‘n’ that when divided by some given divisor leaves given 
remainders [11]. 
Given the moduli set mi for i=1,2,…n such that all are relative primes, i.e., gcd(m1, m2) = 
1 for i ≠ j, there exists a unique number ‘u’ in the range [0, M-1] where M=m1,m2….mn 
and let r1r2…rn be integers. Then the congruent equations x ≡ r1modm1, x ≡ r2modm2, …. 









For example, Let mi={2,3} where m0=2 and m1=3, M=2*3=6, Let A be the nodes in a 
network. A->{0,1,2,3,4,5}. Using CRT {(A, A mod m0), (A, A mod m1) } the tuples 
generated are  {(0,0),(1,1),(0,2),(1,0),(0,1)(1,2)}. 
2.7 Routing Schema in Cognitive Radio Network 
In order to do the distribution of the keys that were generated using the CRT, it is 
essential to know the routing schema of the CR network. Hence, we review the routing 
schemas. 
For multi-hop CRN’s routing is grouped into 2 categories:  
➢ Approach based on the full spectrum knowledge  













Figure 7: Routing Schemes in CR network [12] 
Here, we choose the Graph based approach which needs a full Spectrum Knowledge to 
pre-distribute the keys in the network. In the graph based approach, a route designing is 
done using graph abstraction & route calculation [12]. 
Graph Abstraction: This refers to the generation of a logical graph representing the 
network topology.  














Graph based routing approach through layered-graphs: 
The framework is based on the creation of layered graph which features a number of 
layers equal to the number of available channels. The edges of the layered graph can be 
of three types: Access edges (small dotted line in fig 8) connect each node with all the 
corresponding subnodes. Horizontal edges (dark line lying on the horizontal planes in 
fig 8) between pairs of subnodes belonging to the same logical layer are added to the 
graph. Vertical edges (dashed vertical edges in fig 8) connect subnodes of different 
layers of a single secondary device and represent the capabilities to switch from one 
channel to another. 
 

















            STASIS TRAP ATTACK IN CR NETWORKS 
3.1 Overview of Stasis Trap Attack 
An attacker can manipulate MAC protocols to launch a Stasis Trap attack. This is a cross 
layer attack where it is difficult to detect the attacker. This Cross layer attack is launched 
from the MAC layer as the point of attack but ultimately aims to degrade the TCP layer’s 
end to end throughput of flows within its transmission range by exploiting the TCP 
congestion control mechanism. 
 The stasis trap attack is launched against neighboring nodes by periodically preempting 
the wireless channel in order to cause large variations in Round Trip Time (RTT) of TCP 
flows which are within the range of the adversary. This causes a significant drop in 
throughput flows, thereby creating “stasis trap”. It has very little effect on MAC-layer 
throughput and hence is very difficult to detect [1]. 
The adversary attacking the MAC layer can preempt the channel by manipulating the 
back-off mechanism. Moreover, an attacker can change the transmission destination to 
evade detection from qualified observers [see section 2.3]. It is difficult for a single 













Figure 9: Stasis Trap attack scenario [1] 
In Fig 9, node A is an attacker which can switch its transmission between R1 and R2 in a 
round robin manner. This attacker has less effect on channel contention mechanism or 
MAC layer throughput due to the periodic change of channel. So it gets difficult for the 
qualified observers [see section 2.3] to detect it. The main target of the stasis attack is the 
TCP layer. Its aim is to degrade the end-to-end throughput of TCP flows traversing 
through neighboring nodes. 
In the above figure, Flow1 and Flow2 are two TCP flows. We know the RTO 
(Retransmission Timeout) mechanism which was designed for packet losses by 
calculating RTT (Round Trip Time) of the packet. If RTT is greater than RTO then the 
TCP sender assume there is a packet loss and responds by reducing the congestion 
window size and retransmitting the packet again. Now, if an attacker occupies the 












throughput of the flows will drop significantly. 
In the Transport Layer protocol, CR-link alternates between spectrum sensing and 
transmission modes. This CR-link shows increase or decrease variation in RTT. The 
reason for this is when the nodes for the CR-link enter into spectrum sensing mode, the 
source will not receive packets. As soon as spectrum sensing is completed the source 
node receives several ACK (acknowledgements) waiting in the network, which increases 
the RTT. Because of this waiting in the network, RTT for these packets increase by an 
amount equal to the spectrum sensing duration (ssd). 
When CR is in sensing mode, the spectrum sensing duration (ssd) is calculated. If the 
RTT + spectrum sensing duration (ssd) > Retransmission Timeout (RTO), the timer 
expires which means the sender assumes that packet was lost and responds by reducing 
the congestion window size and retransmitting the packet again. As a result, the 
throughput of the flows will drop significantly. The congestion window sizes are reduced 
to half of the previous value [2], and the TCP enters into slow-start state. This happens 
due to the “Stasis Trap Attack” in Cognitive Radio Networks where the point of attack is 
at the MAC layer but the target layer is TCP layer, which degrades the end-end 














3.2 Algorithm for Statis Trap Attack 
 The algorithm for Stasis Trap Attack is explained below based on fig 9. 
❖ Step 1: S1 sends a packet to D1 through intermediate node R1 i.e. the Transport 
Layer flow (Flow1). 
❖ Step 2: Attacker node A starts blocking the channel towards R1 through MAC layer 
at periodic intervals. 
❖ Step 3: R1 changes to spectrum sensing mode. 
❖ Step 4: When A diverts to the other node (R2), then R1 sends ACK to sender S1. 
❖ Step 5: At S1, If [RTT + spectrum sensing duration (ssd) > RTO].  
❖ Step 6: then there is a decrease in throughput. 


































3.3 Simulation Results 
The main target of the stasis trap attack is to degrade the TCP flow and as a result 
throughput is reduced and network performance is degraded. Our simulation results 
showed that the network performance (throughput) fell down below 40%; so it is 
necessary for the network to be resilient to such kind of attacks. 
Our simulation uses ns2.34 [15] (network simulator) to investigate the effect of stasis trap 
attack on network performance. Node mobility was not considered in the simulation. The 
network topology consists of 50 nodes. The nodes are placed randomly with equal 
communication range (150 meters). The source node 20 communicates with the 
destination node 45 through the intermediate nodes 21, 22, 23, 24. And another source 
node 32 communicates with destination 47 through 33, 34, 35,36. The paths are chosen 













Figure 11: Layout of cognitive radio network of 50 nodes 
Before transmitting data, the source nodes sends RTS message to destination i.e., 
REQUEST TO SEND for estimating ROUND TRIP TIME (RTT) for transmitting data to 
destination. After receiving RTS message from source, destination replies with CTS 
(CLEAR TO SEND) message. After receiving CTS message from destination, the source 
node starts transmitting data to destination through the intermediate nodes. At a certain 
time, one of the neighbors, say node-29 behaves as a malicious node and attacks the 
MAC layer of the intermediate nodes 23 and 35 (see figure 10). As a result the TCP 
FLOW is reduced and intermediate nodes 23 and 35 not able to transmit data in a 
constraint data rate. This is because the RTT (ROUND TRIP TIME) exceeds the RTO 













Simulation results show that: 
 The throughput rate before cross layer attack – 97 kb/s 
 The throughput rate after cross layer attack – 33 kb/s 
 
 
























Figure 13: Throughput Analysis after Attack vs Time 
 


































The throughput rate up to time 5.0 sec is 97 kb/s. This is the throughput when the 
network is not under attack. At time 6.05, the malicious node starts attacking the mac 
layer of intermediate nodes 23 and 35. After this time the throughput falls drops rapidly 
to 33 kb/s as can be seen in the graph.  
The simulation results show that this cross layer attack although aimed at affecting the 
MAC layer of the nodes, affects the TCP flow and there is a sudden fall in throughput 
rate (about 40%). 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have identified the Stasis Trap Attack in Cognitive Radio networks. 
This attack employs a cross layer design where the point of attack is at the MAC layer 
but the impact of the attack is on TCP layer throughput by exploiting the TCP congestion 
control mechanism in Cognitive Radio. This is a difficult attack to detect as the attack is 






















DEFENSE ON STASIS TRAP ATTACK BASED ON KEY PRE DISTRIBUTION  
In this section, we process a novel deterministic pre distribution algorithm using the 
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) [11] as a defense mechanism against the stasis 
attack. 
4.1 Overview 
An analysis of recently proposed MAC protocols reveals that they lack MAC layer 
authentication. In IEEE 802.22, which is a single hop network, there is a security sub-
layer that provides confidentiality and authentication to MAC frames. The security sub-
layer thwarts MAC-layer DOS (Denial of Service) attacks by preventing the modification 
of MAC frames. The security sub-layer employs an authenticated client/server key 
management protocol in which the base station acts as the trusted server. Unfortunately, 
such a protocol cannot be implemented in a multi-hop CR network since there is no 
trusted entity to act as a server. Without an authentication mechanism, adversaries can 
forge MAC control frames to launch these type of attacks. 
Our aim is to provide security to the MAC layer by using a deterministic key pre 
distribution algorithm. The key distribution is such that, a pool of symmetric keys is 
chosen and a subset of the pool (key chain) is distributed to each node. If any two nodes 












common key. If they don’t have any key in common, then they check with the 
neighboring nodes to see if they have a node which shares a common key individually 
with each of these nodes. This process continues till they find a key path through which 
they can communicate. For example, consider four nodes A, B, C, D and say, A and D 
want to communicate and have no keys in common. These two nodes check with the 
neighboring nodes (B, C) to see if they have any keys in common. If they find any, they 
communicate with that node. Here, say A and C have a common key and B and D have a 
common key and C and B also have a common key. Then, they communicate through the 
key path A -- C -- B -- D.   
4.2 Key pre-distribution phase: 
1) Parameter Selection: 
We select the network size N 
Next select the relative prime numbers, such that N≤M, where M=m1m2 m3…mn 
2) Key Pool Arrangement: 
The keys present in the key pool will be represented by using relative prime numbers. ( 
KPx -> Key Pool for all the relative prime numbers). The key pair is represented by (ai, 
bi) where ai - is the identifier of the node and bi - is the key value generated using 
Chinese remainder theorem 












KP1- (1, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2)… (1, m2-1) 




KPn-1- (n-1, 0), (n-1, 1), (n-1, 2)… (n-1, mn-1) 
3) Key Chain Generation: 
Key chain is a subset of keys chosen from the key pool. The key chains are generated by 
finding out the key combinations using the Chinese remainder theorem. The set of node 
identifiers is A ɛ {0 to (N-1)} 
Algorithm for key distribution: 
➢ N number of nodes in the network and each node requires keys for communication. 
➢ Choose Relative prime numbers (RPN) that satisfy the condition M≥N, where 
M=m1*m2* m3…mn and m1, m2,  m3, …mn are relative prime numbers. 
➢ The key pair is represented by (ai, bi) where ai - is the identifier of the node and bi - is 
the key value generated using Chinese remainder theorem. 
➢ Assume Identifier ai = i. Key value ‘bi’ is calculated by using bi = A mod mi where A 
is the unique ID of each node. mi is the relative prime number chosen and bi is the key 
value generated for the specific node. 
➢ The pair wise symmetric keys are chosen from the key pool and are distributed to the 












➢ They communicate through a secure path on which every pair of neighboring nodes 
share a key. 
➢ Shared key discovery phase: Source node determines the common key shared with 
the neighboring nodes from their identifiers.  
➢ For example, for communication between nodes 3 and 7, the nodes check for 
common keys between them by using the unique ID of the nodes.  
➢ If they don’t share a common key, they communicate using the neighboring nodes as 
the intermediate nodes and have a secure communication as explained in Section 4.1 
For example, consider the network size be 40. We choose relative prime numbers mi 
where M=m1m2 m3…mn.. Let take 3 RPN (Relatively Prime Number) as m0= 2, m1= 3, 
m2= 7 where M=42 > 40=N. So the condition is satisfied. 
Key Pool:  
KP0:  (0, 0), (0, 1) 
KP1:  (1, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2) 
KP2: (2, 0), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (2, 6) 
Key Chain Generation: 
Key Chain (2, 3, 7): we get the result of ai = A mod mi 



















































































































































































4.3 key Pre Distribution in CR Network: 
In the multi-hop CR MAC protocol, an adversary saturates the common control channel 
by transmitting spurious MAC control frames. In MAC layer, the Distributed channel 
negotiation is carried out with FCL (free channel list) and SEL (selection) frames. Here 
an attacker might send these frames continuously to saturate the channel. 
 To defend against such an attack, we introduce a novel architecture based on 
deterministic key pre distribution to the cognitive radio network. Here we distribute the 
keys using the above algorithm to all the nodes.  
The channel availability is defined as the probability that a channel is accessible to a SU 
after sensing. In Cognitive Radio ad hoc networks, a SU can sense a number of available 
channels before accessing them. But as they are sparsely located and PU activities vary 
with location, it is likely that a channel available to an SU at one location might not be 
available to a SU at another location. Therefore channel availability is not common 
throughout the network. 
Usually the channel availability is uncommon in MAC protocols. Therefore, the 
probability of a channel being common to nodes is comparatively small. Proposed new 
MAC protocol nodes do not require any Common Control Channel for exchanging the 
data [13].  












time. That is, communication pairs, as many as possible, should be able to start 
transmission simultaneously. For transmitting early, nodes should get a chance to reserve 
a channel as early as possible. 
Here, we make use of two different channel lists, namely [13] 
➢ The sorted channel list (SCL), which is a global list of all the channels in the network, 
sorted such that the first channel is most common and the last channel is the least 
common to all member nodes. 
➢ The common channel list (CCL), which is a local list of all the channels common to a 
given communication pair, sorted in the reverse order. 
For example, let the channel list of nodes N1, N2, N3, N4, N5, N6, N7, N8, N9 and N10 be 
N1:        C3 C4 
N2:   C2 C3 C4 
N3:   C2 C3 C4 
N4:   C2             C5 
N5:   C2 C3 C4 C5 
N6: C1      C3 C4 












N8: C1 C2 C3 C4 
N9: C1 C2      C4 
N10:     C2            C5 
SCL would be {C4, C2, C3, C5, C1}. The common channel list will be known to the 
channels common to a given communication pair. We are going to distribute keys for the 
above example. The network size (N) is 10 and assume 2 RPNs   m0= 2, m1= 7 where M = 
14 > 10. As explained before, based on the key pre-distribution algorithm, the following 
keys are distributed as follows: 
Key Pool:  
KP0:  (0, 0), (0, 1) 
KP1: (1, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5), (1, 6) 
Key Chain Generation: 
Key Chain (2, 3, 7): we get the result of ai = A mod mi 














A a0 a1 a2 
N11 (0,1) (1,1)  (2,1) 
N22 (0,0) (1,2)  (2,2) 
N33 (0,1) (1,0)  (2,3) 
N44 (0,0) (1,1)  (2,4) 
N5  5 (0,1) (1,2)  (2,5) 
N6  6 (0,0) (1,0)  (2,6) 
N7   7 (0,1) (1,1)  (2,0) 
N8   8 (0,0) (1,2)  (2,1) 
N9   9 (0,1) (1,0)  (2,2) 
N10   10 (0,0) (1,1)  (2,3) 
 














Figure 15: Common Channel List in the CR Nodes. 
The above figure shows nodes with the available channels (listed in the rectangular box) 
and the keys (in brackets) at each node. We shall now discuss some cases, where the 
source node N1 wants to communicate with node N6. 
Case 1: Share a key and have a common channel 
Here N1 and N6 have a common channel 4 and both nodes have a common key 0 
according to the above table 2. Therefore they can communicate with each other directly 
based on the algorithm discussed in 4.2 
Case 2: Have a common channel but don’t share a key 
In this case if N1 and N6 have a common channel 4 but they don’t share a common key. 
Let us assume N1 and N5 have a common key and similarly N5 and N6 share a key. Here 
N5 acts as an intermediate node and there will be successful communication between N1 
-> N5 -> N6 through channel 4. 












Case 3: If they don’t have a common channel 
If the source and destination don’t have a common channel, then the source node looks 
for the neighbor nodes which have a common channel and a common key.  
In the above diagram if channel 4 is not available, then a PU is using it. Then N1 tries to 
communicate with node N3 using another channel, namely, channel 2. And N3 
communicates with N6 using channel 1. Therefore there is successful communication 
between N1 -> N3 using channel 2 and N3 -> N6 using channel 1.   
 














 Red Circle- Source and Destination nodes 
 Black Circle – Node with a common channel but no common key with its parent node 
 Orange Circle- Node with a common Key with its parent node. 
 Yellow Circle- Destination Node with no common key.  
 Edge represents nodes within communication range. 
 Number in a circle represents node id. 
 Individual number - available channels shared with parent node. 
 Triplet (a, b, c) – Keys of a node (see Table 2) 
Here, Node N1 is trying to communicate with node N6. Firstly, the keys are pre-
distributed to every Node (see table 2). N1 looks for the Nodes in the available channel 
list to communicate and checks for common keys between them. N1 and N6 have a 
common channel 4 but cannot communicate as they don’t have a common key. Hence N1 
looks for intermediate nodes through which it can communicate to N6.Here, it 
communicates with N3 and N5 through channel 2 and 4 with common key 1. Now N3 
tries to do the same and communicates with the nodes in the available channels and a 
common key. Here, N3 communicates with destination node N6 using channel 1 with key 













4.4 Algorithm for generating a path between two nodes 
Input C<List>=Ф     [List is null] 
Algorithm  
NS  Source Node, ND  Destination Node 
repeat  
C1<1.. n>      [Channel list of the source node] 
for i= 1 to n 
NJ<1.. m>     [Common Nodes under channel Ci] 
for j = 1 to m  
if (NS (Key) == NJ (Key))   [Check for the common keys] 
if (NJ == ND )    [Check for the Destination node] 
then exit 
else C<list>.add CJ<list> [Else add the intermediate node 
channels to C<list>] 
C1 = C<list> 
until K=0 [Until it exits the loop] 


























4.5 Simulation Results 
Analysis for CRT – Key Pre Distribution 
Key connectivity is a measure of the probability of key-sharing between two or more 
nodes. That is, it is a measure of the number of pairs of nodes that have at least one key 
common between them out of the total number of possible pairs of nodes. As the size of 
the key chain increases, the probability of key sharing between the nodes will increase. 
Hence the key connectivity increases. Say there are ‘N’ numbers of nodes in the network. 
So the total numbers of pairs of possible nodes are N (N-1)/2. 
The number of pairs of nodes having at least one key (NKCS) can be derived as follows. 
Let us consider we have m0m1m2m3. NKCS is [Number of key connectivity sharing key in 
MSB (0
th
) position] + [Number of key connectivity sharing key in 1
st
 position - Number 




 position] + [Number of key 
connectivity sharing key in 2
nd
 position ─ Number of key connectivity sharing key in (2, 
0) position ─ Number of key connectivity sharing key in (2, 1) position + Number of key 
connectivity sharing key in (2,1,0) position] + [Number of key connectivity sharing key 
in 3
rd
 position ─ Number of key connectivity sharing key in (3,0) position ─ Number of 
key connectivity sharing key in (3,1) position ─ Number of key connectivity sharing key 
in (3,2) position + Number of key connectivity sharing key in (3,0,1) position + Number 












key in (3,1,2) position]. 
So NKCS = m0m1m2m3 (m1m2m3─1)/2 + m0m1m2m3 (m0m2m3─1)/2 ─ m0m1m2m3 
(m2m3─1)/2 + m0m1m2m3 (m0m1m3─1)/2 ─ m0m1m2m3 (m1m3─1)/2 ─ (m0m1m2m3 
(m0m3─1)/2) ─ m0m1m2m3 (m3─1)/2 + m0m1m2m3 (m0m1m2─1)/2 ─ m0m1m2m3 
(m1m2─1)/2 ─ (m0m1m2m3 (m0m2─1)/2) ─ m0m1m2m3 (m2─1)/2 ─ (m0m1m2m3 
(m0m1─1)/2) ─ m0m1m2m3 (m1─1)/2 ─ m0m1m2m3 (m0─1)/2. 
Hence the number of pairs of nodes having at least one key is: 
NKCS = ∑      
(   )  
    ∑  (   )    (  )   
(   )    
    ∑       
(   )  
   
 (  )   ∑      
(   )  
   (   )       (  )     (   )    (  )  
 (   )     
Java code for generating keys for all the nodes in the network was written for simulation. 
The network size, key chain size and the relative prime numbers that are used in 
generating the keys for all the nodes in the network are input. The nodes in the network 
are static. The formula calculates key connectivity. The following are a few scenarios 













Figure 18: Key Connectivity with different set of RPN numbers 
The above figure shows key connectivity for a network size of 2000 using different 
combinations of PRP (Pairwise Relatively Prime numbers) with different key chain sizes. 
From the graph, a higher connectivity is observed with the set of PRPs that are prime. For 
example consider PRP numbers set1, (2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17). All of them are prime 
numbers. Consider another set3 (3, 5, 12, 20, 32, 65) and here some are not prime. 
Connectivity for the set1 is 0.1, but for set2 connectivity is 0.82.  So connectivity can be 




































Figure 19: Key Connectivity for various network sizes with constant keychain size 
The above figure shows the key connectivity for various network sizes using different 
combinations of PRP numbers which are prime with constant key chain size of three. In 
this scenario, we observed a higher connectivity for the smallest PRP numbers 



































Figure 20: Key Connectivity for various network sizes with different key chain sizes 
Key connectivity using different key chain sizes for different network sizes is assessed by 
selecting PRP numbers as smallest continuous combinations of prime. It is observed from 
the graph that by increasing key chain size with network size, connectivity also increases. 
Analysis on Key pre Distribution in a CR Network  
The main task is to safely distribute the shared keys to the node. The key pre distribution 
is such that, a pool of symmetric keys is chosen and a subset of the pool (key chain) is 
distributed to each node. If any two nodes want to communicate with each other, they 
search their key chain to see if they share a common key. If they don’t have any key in 
common, then they check with the neighboring nodes to see if they have a node which 


































they find a key path through which they can communicate. 
Our simulation uses ns2.34 (network simulator) [15], we investigated the effect of stasis 
trap attack on network performance. Node mobility was not considered in the simulation. 
The network topology consists of 50 nodes. Choosing 4 relative prime numbers (2, 3, 5, 
7). In cognitive radio the data is transmitted through the channels, after the channel 
allocation only it transmits data. For simulation purpose, we have chosen common 
channel among the nodes for communication. The source node communicates with the 
neighbor nodes through common key to reach the destination. Here source node 20 
communicates with node 21 through common key (0), node 21 communicate with node 
22 through key (1), node 22 communicates with node 23 through key (1), node 23 
communicates with node 24 through key (3) and node 24 communicates with destination 
node 45 through key (0). At a certain time attacker node 29 attacks the Mac layer of data 
transmitting node 23.  
When an attacker tries to communicate with an intermediate node, the node cannot send 
ACKs to the source node through its neighboring node before its timeout. Hence the 
source node knows what node is under attack and tries to take an alternative path to the 
destination that avoids the node under attack. The alternative path is chosen based on a 
Tree-based algorithm (see section 4.4). It finds an alternative shortest path such that the 
intermediate node under attack is not in the path. If the attack takes place in the new path 













Table 3: Node-Id with their keys and common keys 
 












The alternative path goes through nodes 20, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 44 and 45. Here source 
node 20 communicates with node 14 through common key (0), node 14 communicates 
with node 15 through key (0), node 15 communicates with node 16 through key (1), node 
16 communicates with node 17 through key (1), node 17 communicates with node 18 
through key (3), node 18 communicates with node 44 through key (0) and node 44 
communicates with destination node 45 through key (0) [see figure 21].  
 
Figure 22: Throughput Analysis vs Time after applying key1 pre distribution algorithm 
The graph shows that the throughput is about 97 kb/s until 6.4 sec, at this point the 
attacker attacks the mac layer of the intermediate node 23, which results in a slight drop 
in throughput rate. As soon as the attack begins the source node takes an alternate path to 
the destination through common keys and channels. As the graph shows, the throughput 























   CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, we have identified a multi-layer attack on CRNs where the attack is 
targeted at the MAC layer to cause channel saturation. The effect of the attack is seen at 
the TCP layer where throughput is substantially reduced. Simulation results show that the 
TCP performance was reduced due to the attack. 
We have also proposed a defense against the multi-layer stasis trap attack, using a 
deterministic key pre-distribution scheme. The process of determining the keys or key 
chain is based on the Chinese remainder theorem. Simulation results show that even 
though the throughput was slightly reduced at the start of the attack, the throughput was 
restored to its pre-attack levels by finding an alternative path.  
Future work would include more detailed analysis of the proposed framework.  We can 
also identify other multi-layer attacks in cognitive radio network. The defense framework 
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